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Abstract. Contrary to a widely held view, rather than seeing the certification of Occupational 
Health and Safety (OHS) as a barrier to increasing employee participation, this article views new 
ways of structuring participation as a necessary step towards making improvements in OHS 
management systems. The article first considers how work organization has changed and then in a 
similar way traces how bargaining  has shifted from being distributive to become integrative to 
create a fundamental change in the negotiation regime. Finally, by analysing an OHS-certified firm 
in greater depth, the article shows how solutions for improvements in OHS management and 
notable bottom-up formulations of OHS benchmarks may help us discover how the organizational 
form of firms in which high-performance work organization can be developed through new 
participative structures. 
 
1. Introduction: is employee participation possible under OHS certification? 
Until recently it has been argued that OHS was best looked after by effective government regulation 
and inspection combined with safety organizations (SO) and safety councils (SC), with employee 
participation at the level of individual firms. In this way firms would be forced to take OHS issues 
into consideration when optimizing the efficiency of a given set of routines by making increasing 
use of technology, aiming for economies of scale and coordinating the activities of bureaucratic 
hierarchies (Nelson and Winther 1982; Chandler 1962, 1977).  
Observers investigating this previous system found that one of its weaknesses was that SOs and SCs 
never became fully integrated into the managerial system of production but were placed in a ‘side-
car’ position from which it was difficult to achieve effective influence on the firm (Frick 1994; 
Frick et al. 2000). To its critics, this system could only be improved by granting employees sitting 
on SCs greater participatory power over decisions concerning investments, choice of technologies, 
the setting of local standards in employment relations, etc. 
However, instead of reforms improving the system through increased participatory power for local 
SCs and creating refined procedures for their collaboration with the state’s OHS authorities, in 
many countries reforms of the system have evolved towards greater self-regulation on the part of 
employers. In Denmark and other countries, firms could simply obtain certification (e.g. under 
OHSAS 18001) of their management system for OHS purposes and in this way escape the costs and 
inconveniencies of routine inspections by the OHS authorities. To those who saw participation as 
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being dependent on government control and vice versa, certification broke a cumulative chain of 
causation that could have led to a better system (Dawson and Clinton, 1988; Frick 2009; Frick et al. 
2000). 
There are good reasons to question whether this would in fact have led to a better system as the 
economy re-organized. With the turn to a new economy where internal work organization, 
technology, and relations among firms and with stakeholders change frequently (Allwin and 
Aronsson 2003), government control and inspection, as well as employee representatives in SCs, 
would easily become overburdened, as indeed they are in most cases. This would lead to highly 
formal, ritualistic, legalistic and very bureaucratic OHS management (OHSM) systems reinforcing 
the side-car positions of SCs and employee participation. 
Where they are in place, existing participatory systems of shop stewards, convenors and work 
councils (WC-related participatory systems) under the new economy are urgently needed to deal 
with constantly changing and novel competitive situations, while SC-related participatory systems 
may stick to bureaucratically ordained tasks that are repetitive and easily ignored. This may happen 
despite the new forms of work organization that call for much more attention from employee 
representatives in SCs. In this way the existing participatory and negotiating system has reached its 
limits and is in need of reform. 
Rethinking and studying promising cases of a new division of labour in participatory systems in 
relation to OHS certification offers a chance to answer the following questions: 1) how can the 
participatory influence of employees be reformed and strengthened by working with OHS 
certification?; and 2) how may new ways of participation co-evolve with new forms of work 
organization and constitute a new negotiation regime within the constitution of firms? 
The chosen analytical strategy is not normative and deductive. Rather, it analyzes a case where 
certification has led to an advanced form of OHSM with a high degree of participation in order to 
discover inductively how it could take the next steps in constituting itself in a novel way. Before 
doing this, the second section will answer the question: can OHS certification be seen as a suitable 
form of regulation in the new economy? Then the third section aims at mapping out how 
negotiating regimes have gradually changed from distributive to integrative bargaining. Then the 
ground is ready for the fourth section to examine an extreme case of certified OHSM (Flyvbjerg, 
2001), where the next steps for reform becomes visible. We show how a new division of labour 
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among participatory bodies and engagement in bottom-up formulations of OHS benchmarks could 
lead to cumulative advances in both OHS certification and general participation. 
 
2. New ways of organizing firms and the role of OHS certification 
Since the 1980s, the discourse on industrial firms has undergone profound changes. Globalization is 
said to have forced firms in the Western hemisphere to look constantly for novel ways to reduce 
costs, improve and innovate by taking advantage of constantly changing global value chains and 
open and internationally dispersed innovation networks (Chesbrough 2003, Herrigel 2007; Herrigel 
and Zeitlin 2010). Multinationals are said to have evolved into transnationals (Bartlett and Ghoshal 
1998) engaged in endemic internal and external searches for ways to combine novel sources of both 
cost reductions and innovation cross-nationally in order to position themselves strongly in the eyes 
of financial communities by organizing competition and bargaining over investments and 
concessions among their subsidiaries (Kristensen and Zeitlin 2005), work teams and suppliers. 
Pressure from an increasingly complex context has created a situation in which firms must 
constantly change their roles in relation to other firms, and where the rules of the game are 
constantly shifting. 
The need to make frequent shifts of roles in relation to customers, suppliers and other partners and 
adversaries has reinforced the pressure for reforms of the internal work organization (Boltanski and 
Chiapello 2005) and transformation towards high-performance work organization (HPWO) in 
which jobs and technology are undergoing permanent re-structuring. In itself this often provides 
leeway for old aspirations for greater employee participation (Whitfield 1997; Heller et al. 1998; 
Ramsay et al. 2000; Harley et al. 2006), which is simply necessary for firms to be capable of 
reacting quickly to external changes and earn profits from investments. In this way firms are 
experimentally searching for a new constitutional order, engaging employees in an increasingly 
collaborative community (Heckscher and Adler, 2006; Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005; Lotz, 2009) 
while at the same time circumscribing a complex set of constituent, continuous and ad hoc teams 
held together by competition and cooperation, information and knowledge-sharing, participatory 
processes of negotiation, etc.  
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Combining the former OHS system of government regulation and inspection with SCs cannot cope 
with the pace of changes in the new economy, as this way og regulating was much better adapted to 
firms with fairly fixed forms of work organization and where inspection and rules could be imposed 
on slowly changing production processes. In the frequently changing HPWOs self-inspection and 
regulation become necessary; certification is a way of guiding this new way of doing things. 
But certification is also needed because firms today are increasingly dependent on making use of 
other firms and on being used by others in unpredictable ways. This has in many cases led to 
certification and a setting of standards that makes it possible to assess a potential partner company 
before one links up with it. In distributed value chains, firms looking for suppliers need information 
about how suppliers perform financially, control quality, keep promises in relation to delivery 
times, etc., etc. Furthermore a number of difficult cases (e.g. Nike) have made clear to employers 
the importance of ensuring that suppliers’ working conditions, environmental impacts and corporate 
social responsibilities will not undermine the reputation of the outsourcing firm. Thus the new 
production regime has increased the need for mutual transparency among firms, and systems of 
certification and benchmarking both within traditional fields of corporate governance, quality, 
guarantees etc. and such novel areas as environmental management (ISO 14001), working 
conditions (SA 8000) and corporate social responsibility (ISO 26000). 
Seen in this perspective, OHS certification is just another element in the swarm of novel demands 
being imposed on firms by external stakeholders, and in some cases an OHSAS 18001 certification 
could be conditional for winning contracts from leading firms or for recruiting employees who are 
in high demand in the general labour market. Some firms even take the next step and deliberately 
enter competitions to be nominated as the Best Workplace of the Year, best place for 
apprenticeship, etc., just as they compete to win a quality or design prize. 
The shift in how firms are organized and the turn to a system of transparency and benchmarking in 
relation to external stakeholders seems to have totally recast the issue of employee participation in 
industrial relations. On the one hand, cultivating the international ability to make role shifts and 
move towards HPWOs can in many ways be seen as undermining the legacy of hierarchy and 
bureaucracy as a means of rationalization, given that work teams become better informed about 
current practices and their possibilities for improvement than their principals. The operatives that 
change working routines are also the first to discover OHS problems. Thus under certain conditions 
the participation of employees simply becomes a must rather than a benign opportunity. On the 
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other hand, the constant changes in the rules of the game in the form of waves of novel benchmarks 
seem to reaffirm and consolidate company hierarchies at the apex, since they must ordain novel 
measures, lay down procedures for reporting, evaluate reports, diagnose why benchmarks are not 
being met and design novel interventions to respond to increasing external pressures. Thus it seems 
as if managers need to take strong control of their companies. But for this to be timely they need to 
engage employees, as it is the latter who have the knowledge that makes it possible diagnose 
problems and design new forms of intervention. 
In most case studies of reformed corporations, experimental processes are said to have led to a 
decline in the power and influence of middle- and line-managers (Heller et al., 1998; Harley et al. 
2006), creating a ‘hole in the middle’ between the top layer of the organization, which nonetheless 
looks similar to the old hierarchy and bureaucracy, and the bottom of the organization, which is 
often composed of a shifting ecology of relatively continuous and ad hoc teams. This hole is 
occupied either by a new constituency of HRM officers, coaches and supervisors, or by a dense 
network of shop stewards and convenors or both. New managerial techniques that are intended to 
help employees search for continuous improvements such as root cause analysis, appreciative 
enquiry, simultaneous engineering and heuristic design (Helper et al. 2000) constitute the armoury 
of the populace of this new no-man’s-land, which works under a regime of benchmarking and 
performance assessment. Finding ordering principles for this no-man’s-land seems to be one of the 
greatest challenges in HPWOs. 
To complicate matters still further, in some, primarily Anglo-Saxon countries the transformation 
towards new types of firms has primarily come in the form of management reforms (JIT, TQM, 
TPM, Lean, etc.), i.e. top-down reforms imposing a new system and giving teams a predesigned 
role in a preset role matrix. In other countries, such as Scandinavia, Austria and the Netherlands, 
changes have become bottom-up, taking the form of experiments with novel forms of autonomy at 
work, and creating a highly autonomous work organization that has learned to search for continuous 
improvements and innovation, including searching for novel ways of managing (Lorenz and 
Valeyre 2003). In both variants of the emerging new constitutional order of the company, the road 
so far has been full of problems and surprises (see e.g. Heller et al. 1998; Vallas 2003; Minssen 
2006) and has failed in terms of participation, commitment and performance – in particular when 
reforms became top-down. To these observers , this is partly because no one seems to have had a 
comprehensive view of what the new constitution would look like, and they simultaneously show 
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that the bundling of new principles of HRM, teamed forms of organization, communication and 
negotiations etc. produces better performance than when only a few elements of reform are found in 
firms. Whereas bureaucracy had a form that made it possible for agents to work continuously on its 
improvement, the new heterarchy (Stark 2009) has not yet become so visible that systematic 
improvements of an ‘ideal type’ are possible, whether in terms of lasting principles of organization 
or of new participatory principles and procedures. However, there seems to be increasing evidence 
that, in order to achieve the promised gains in terms of performance, firms must move towards a 
more comprehensive system. This only seems to happen where participation and negotiation take 
place between employees and managers (Vallas, 2003; Minssen 2006). 
Although often seen as an iron cage, bureaucracy too was never a fixed entity. In itself it paved its 
way into the corpus of society as a means to rationalize and civilize organizational forms that were 
often characterized by nepotism and clientelism. But soon it became clear that bureaucracy itself 
was not a stable state. As Anselm Strauss (1978) pointed out long ago, in itself bureaucracy is a 
negotiated order, where novel situations, unintended consequences, etc. constantly have to be dealt 
with by parties engaged in negotiations over reforms, revisions and the bending of rules, if not over 
the invention of new rules. And certainly even the most advanced form of earlier bureaucracies – 
the multidivisional form – was as riddled with problems as are the new forms of organization 
(Jackall 1988, Chandler 1984). But whereas bureaucracy might be seen as a ‘negotiated order’, the 
new regime might be regarded as a ‘processual ordering’ that takes place within a constitution of 
negotiation fields (Strauss 1998). This does indeed recast questions of participation radically.  
In this article, I argue that the new form of organization and the procedures and processes that it 
organizes can be seen as offering increasing space for the participatory influence of employees, and 
that OHS certification may be embedded in these new forms of organizations in such a way that it 
not only leads to improved working conditions, but also indicates a path towards a new regime of 
enterprise negotiation. 
 
3. Towards a New Negotiating Regime in Work Organizations and the Role of 
OHS 
OHS is an obvious place to start if employees are to begin to learn to make creative use of the novel 
language of benchmarking that comes from financial institutions, certification bureaux, government 
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bodies, NGOs etc. With fierce competition and an increasing number of external benchmarks to be 
met, the novel forms of firms could easily become ‘over-determined’ by their socio-economic 
environments. There are therefore good reasons why local managers and employees should engage 
in integrative bargaining based on endogenously developed benchmarks so that they recapture a say 
in the creative construction of the destiny of the firm and might be able to transform the current, 
confused organizational configuration of firms into a new, more fully fledged constitutional order 
(e.g. a collaborative community (Heckscher and Adler 2006)).  
For this to happen, a transformation from the traditional negotiation regime of distributive 
bargaining to one of integrative bargaining (Sisson and Marginson 2000), where managers and 
employees alike further their own interests while taking into consideration the interests of their 
‘distributional adversaries’, is very productive. 
Up to the 1980s distributive bargaining was the norm, and local union activists looked in particular 
at how effectively individual firms observed the rules and regulations that were established in 
central negotiations and general agreements. In many continental European countries, however, 
central agreements were preparing the ground for integrative and more operational issues at the firm 
level. In covering enterprise constitutional issues, such as local bargaining rights and worker 
representation on firm-level bodies such as boards, works councils and OHS councils, and in 
mandating local employee-representatives to make local wage-, welfare-, technology- and further 
training agreements, the negotiating order was in flux.  
In many countries the education of shop stewards and OHS representatives improved considerably, 
and the more they engaged in negotiating and striking local agreements, the more proficient 
convenors, shop-stewards and board representatives became (Scheuer 2003). This institutionalized 
increased local capabilities for local negotiations in many ways, and in retrospect the diffusion of 
bargaining over wages, flexible working hours, technology and training agreements, etc. to local 
levels shifted the balance of the negotiation regime towards the sector or firm level in many 
countries (European Commission 2004). 
In this way local union activists were being prepared for the Sturm und Drang period of 1990, 
which saw a simultaneous quantum leap in foreign direct investments, intensified experiments with 
novel ways of organizing work, intensified further training of workers and the diffusion of 
computer literacy. In many ways economic organization mutated and created novel circles of 
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reinforcement with both the industrial relations (IR) regime and the larger welfare state, most 
obviously through more active labour market policies (ibid.). But progress in this direction came in 
very different ways in different countries due to differences in IR regimes. In Denmark workers 
were and still are organized in many craft or professional unions, but not being separated into 
unions representing different political/religious orientation. In firms each craft section elects its own 
shop steward so that the community of shop stewards becomes a field for integrative bargaining 
among a multiplicity of diverging employee interests. This community in turn elects a convenor to 
speak on its behalf to management, whether this happens in work councils (WCs) or on boards. 
Because the ideological divisions among unions and the local union representatives are minor, this 
system does not tend to reproduce the social partners at firm level as adversaries, but rather as a 
partnership that jointly solves problems. 
Studies of Danish firms during the 1990s (Kristensen and Zeitlin 2005;  Kristensen 2003; 
Kristensen  and Lilja 2009) show that convenors and shop stewards engaged heavily in partnerships 
with top managers in experimenting with shifting forms of work organization, meeting shifting 
benchmarks, often developing model factories to be diffused internationally and engaging even 
blue-collar workers in international activities. This was done primarily to protect jobs, but also to 
ensure that employees would systematically improve their skills while being employed in a certain 
plant by training and by moving up in the hierarchy of challenges on the internal labour markets of 
firms. During that decade local activists often found themselves isolated from the central hierarchy 
of the union, which proved unable to provide answers and advice when local activists were dealing 
with the foreign headquarters of multinationals, searching for ways to meet novel benchmarks, etc. 
Local union branches often had more to offer as they engaged locally with the boards of vocational 
schools, employment agencies, municipal welfare services, etc. and combined public institutions in 
shifting polyarchies (Dorf and Sabel 1998) to solve transitional problems within both firms and 
local labour markets simultaneously as they sought novel ways of working. Connecting neo-
corporatist bodies at the local level that could combine traditional services in innovative ways and 
negotiating internal transformations of the workplace gave local union activists a very strong 
position, one never seen before in Danish history. In many ways local union activists transformed 
negotiations in the direction of an integrative regime in which managers and unions jointly sought 
novel ways of integrating their changing interests instead of simply representing them repeatedly in 
the same way (Mary Parker Follett 1951). 
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But union activists creating this nexus of representation, participation and negotiation between the 
lean hierarchy at the top and the ecology of teams at the bottom also started to fill the ‘hole in the 
middle’ of the new HPWOs. In this hole, misunderstandings, uncertain role profiles for middle 
managers and the destruction of trust between middle managers and employees proliferated. To 
reconcile problems, local union activists became permanent negotiators, trying to find compromises 
between adversaries and acting against the tendency to seek sub-optimal solutions in individual 
departments and teams, as they tried to comply with novel but badly understood benchmarks etc. 
The case studies bear witness to this more generally, as shop stewards and convenors frequently 
tried to coordinate horizontally (cooperation) when middle managers were in rivalry along vertical 
axes (competition). Instead of hierarchical coordination, horizontal negotiations were aligning the 
organization with shifting situations. 
However, negotiations as a form of ‘processual ordering’ (Strauss, 1993) carried out as one moves 
along did not become a monopoly for union activists. Rather, this new negotiating behaviour spread 
from a few representatives to penetrate the larger social fabric of organizations. Most often workers 
involved in operational teams are deliberating over daily work, rotation among workplaces, 
recruitment and vacancies, the allocation of holidays, etc. Furthermore, innovation is often 
organized in ad hoc teams that assemble people from a variety of operational teams to solve a 
temporary problem, often headed by members from a lean R&D department. Negotiating the rules 
of the game for such ad hoc teams is situational and often very complicated, as it involves some 
form of ‘contractual’ arrangement among operational teams, who experience disturbances in both 
their operational routines and improvement procedures. Outside formalized bodies, new and 
underexplored issues, such as seniority policy, novel ways of recruiting people, ways of dealing 
with stress, improvements in the health profiles of cafeterias, etc. are dealt with within committees 
where managers and employee members come up with suggestions to be approved by the WC etc. 
In nearly all these forums, committees and teams, deliberation takes place over both role identities 
and role shifts, as well as over how the frequently changing units of the organization may improve 
their interaction and collaboration. Thus negotiations and deliberations have diffused to become the 
way in which processual ordering takes place, instead of being ordered by a fixed bureaucratic 
structure of offices operating with a fixed set of standard procedures. In Denmark, where the change 
to HPWOs most often happened bottom up and was based on fairly autonomous teams, the rest of 
the organization was constructed as quite chaotic responses to unforeseen situations, where 
negotiating partners had to deliberate experimentally about solutions. Obviously, this organizational 
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‘form’ is not very streamlined when it comes to responding to novel benchmarks and performance 
standards that come from certification bureaux, customers, etc. Therefore, an increasing number of 
Danish firms have tried to ‘work towards lean’ since 2000. This has happened by adding two new 
types of ‘elements’ to the already quite complex organizational setting described above. First, a 
growing number of task forces have been formed to collect data responding to externally imposed 
benchmarks and to assess whether the firm is living up to the criteria set by financial institutions, 
certification bureaux, government bodies, etc. Secondly, an increasing number of firms have created 
monitoring teams to look after benchmarks across operational teams. In each operational team, 
members have been allocated a management responsibility, such as looking after reductions in 
failures and costs, the size of stores, environmental damage, improvements in meeting delivery 
deadlines and logistics, upgrading team skills, improving occupational health and safety, etc. Then 
across operational teams, employees with similar managerial responsibilities meet in monitoring 
teams to discuss, diagnose and negotiate how to understand varieties in performance outcomes, 
learn across primary teams and deliberate over initiating new searches for improvements. These 
monitoring teams meet with the relevant task forces, which provide them with the data that make it 
possible to diagnose problems and search for solutions that can assist in the search for 
improvements within operational teams. 
Had the two last mentioned ‘elements’ been introduced in a normal bureaucracy, they could easily 
have been aligned with the hierarchy, as they often are in Anglo-Saxon countries. But in countries 
where ‘learning forms of organization’ with decentralization of responsibilities has already been 
widely diffused, as in the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Austria (Lorenz and Valeyre 2003), 
the destiny is determined by how the negotiation regime merges with monitoring teams, of which 
OHS is one. 
Currently monitoring teams, such as those within OHS, take their main point of departure in, and 
act in response to, the benchmarks and metrics that trickle down from financial institutions, 
government bodies, certification bureaux, NGOs and other potential or actual stakeholders, which 
in a way generates a flow of hierarchically ordered ‘score cards’. This does not mean that the 
‘processual ordering’ within this field of the organization is simply accommodated to externally 
given and ranked benchmarks. Often there are a multiplicity of conflicts among divergent 
benchmarks: for example, it may be difficult to deliver JIT, increase quality, reduce costs and make 
gradual innovations in a product simultaneously, in which case shop stewards and convenors step in 
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and negotiate a temporary scale of priorities among benchmarks. But benchmarks seem almost to be 
given by God, like the Ten Commandments, in the way negotiators take them for granted.  
By taking part in the monitoring teams in interaction with the data-processing task forces within 
fields of continuous improvement, a potentially new space for participation (monitoring 
participation) has emerged. However, the strength and importance of this new participatory role is 
strongly influenced by how the old system of representation (shop stewards, convenors, WCs, 
boards and OHS councils, i.e. representative participation) uses its newly won position in 
integrative bargaining to ensure that monitoring participation becomes involved in data collection, 
analyses of why benchmarks are not being met and what interventions should be designed, so that 
certification does not simply become a new managerial toy. Whereas monitoring participation is set 
up to respond to external or hierarchically given benchmarks in an effective and mechanical way, 
representative participation operates very situationally, is often overburdened by recurrent problems 
and is frequently called on to solve conflicts of coordination so that representatives burn out. 
In the firms studied, consequently, there exists an very unstable organizational figuration, which 
could be solved if overburdened representative participation hands over recurrent tasks to 
monitoring participation, which in turn can only start to work for the endogenous aims of the firm 
by being assisted by the old structures of representative participation. A next step in participatory 
influence is to translate employee aspirations into the language of benchmarks and to enter into the 
negotiations of bottom-up formulations of performance goals that reflect employee aspirations and 
enter them into the game of integrative bargaining. 
The next section analyses an example illustrating the conviction that OHS certification constitutes a 
point at which the novel form of work organization, the new managerial processes and the newly 
negotiated processes of ordering intersect, and where new lessons of how to proceed might be 
learned.   
4. Lessons from a case study of OHS management  
4.1 Case methodology 
In a recent study of the effects of certification on OHS and OHS management (OHSM) systems 
involving twelve firms (Rocha and Hohnen 2010), one firm constituted an extreme case of how 
certification may lead to advanced and sophisticated forms of OHS participation and that, when this 
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does take place, opportunities advance further for the creation of processual ordering. It will 
become clear in this case that the OHSM system has reached a limit concerning improvements 
according to given benchmarks. However, to take a new step, it is necessary not only to formulate 
new benchmarks, but also to create an agency that can improve on the OHSM system and fuel into 
it new benchmarks for future improvements. 
In general the larger study consisted in six steps. First, from databases of OHS-certified firms we 
chose three types of cases: firms with falling, with stable and with increasing number of accidents 
after certification. The case we shall study (PP) fell within the last category, having had a short 
period after certification with a falling number of accidents, which then again increased – which 
proved to be a paradox. Second, a small group of researchers visited the firms for one day each to 
assess their willingness to take part in the study and their suitability for being part of the sample, to 
create relationships of trust and to gather all the written material available that was relevant to the 
study. PP was very interested in participating from the outset. Third, an OHS auditing group from a 
consulting firm was sent to the selected sample of firms to make a professional assessment of the 
state of both OHS and OHSM in each firm. PP proved to be best on most issues covered in the 
reports, despite the increasing number of accidents. These reports then served as a preparation for 
the fourth step, where a larger group from our research team planned and organized a ‘History Lab’ 
in each firm, where all the relevant parties from many levels of the firm participated in creating 
history lines for 1) how the firms’ work organization and general management system had changed 
over the last twenty years; 2) how representative participation had changed; 3) how OHS had 
evolved: had it improved or not; 4) how OHSM had changed in relation to certification; 5) how 
OHS council members had changed roles and spaces on the site; and 6) what the current challenges 
were. 
Fifth, based on a comparison of the materials from the OHS audits and History Labs across the 
sample of firms, PP was chosen for careful investigation (mini-ethnography) over five days, 
interviewing workers, SC members, the wider SO, OHS task force representatives, shop stewards, 
the convenor, production managers, R&D staff and managers working with CSR and sustainability 
reporting. This step was finalized by writing a case report for discussion in the research group and 
drawn up in a form suitable for entering the comparative typologies of the final research publication 
(ibid.). 
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The sixth step was a seminar at the firm’s location (with the representatives who had been present 
in the History Lab and other interested parties) to verify the findings, make corrections and discuss 
the implications of the findings for the future of OHSM and for ways of making better use of 
certification. 
 
4.2 The Case Study 
The firm that is analysed here is a machine-producer called PP, which grew in size after World War 
II when it adopted a number of typical mass-production techniques. However, being very 
development-oriented, it achieved a worldwide reputation for high quality and reliability, and was 
soon producing both large series and customer-specified products. Though it is located in a small 
rural railway town in Jutland, its facilities and buildings are modern, and at the entrance visitors are 
greeted by a gallery of diplomas and honours from competitions it has won over benchmarks in 
product design, quality, ‘Workplace of the year’, etc. Being owned by a family foundation, its 
participation in these contests has been voluntary, and interviews confirmed that since the beginning 
of the 1990s the firm has deliberately entered contests, certifications, etc. in order to generate self-
reflection and self-assessment. 
Until the latter part of the 1990s, OHS was not one of the highest priorities in these self-
assessments. Rather, although the SC may have been known for its radical views, it also displayed a 
lack of clear mandates when it came to assessing working conditions, new technologies or 
buildings. SRs clearly ranked lower than shop stewards and convenors, and the organization of 
participation primarily took place through the WC. Up to this period, OHS initiatives came 
primarily from government regulations specifying a number of threshold values, prohibiting a 
number of chemicals, etc. 
But change was under way from the beginning of the 1990s, as in many other Danish 
manufacturing firms. A task force was organized to prepare for certification of the environmental 
impact of PP after a successful certification of quality standards had been achieved. Experiments 
continued with semi-autonomous teams and Total Quality Management (TQM). Appraisal 
interviews were introduced. To navigate in these new fields, PP welcomed the inspections of 
certifying bureaux and standard-setters and started systematically to take measurements on a whole 
number of new benchmarks, all of which were basically externally defined. 
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 By the end of the decade this movement finally reached OHS, for two reasons. First, environmental 
certification having been achieved, the task force on the environment was looking for new tasks to 
add to its established monitoring function. Secondly, PP learned from the press that it was listed 
among the Danish enterprises with the highest frequencies of work accidents, figures that 
completely contradicted the self-image of the company’s owners. 
On a broad scale, Work Place Assessments (WPAs) were organized to eliminate factors that could 
cause accidents or damage to workers. Some of the most dangerous work processes were 
outsourced. Managers in general were mobilized and allocated to all three work shifts in order to be 
able to monitor the working environment. Simultaneously, the organization of shop stewards, 
convenors and safety representatives underwent an important professionalization. Instead of many 
working part-time, a lesser number were elected for full-time positions so they could work more 
continuously on issues related to working conditions and safety problems. A jump in educational 
levels took place among employee representatives, and the safety organization came to play a much 
more prominent role within the plant’s institutions of participatory democracy. Together employee 
representatives and managers organized OHS campaigns to raise employee awareness, and in 2000 
the focus was on reducing accidents, with every team on the shop floor measuring and announcing 
the number of days without accidents in a very visible way. Instead of simply measuring various 
risks, WPAs became a very systematic tool with which to make continuous improvements to work 
places with heavy lifting and repetitive or stressful routines. 
In a change from TQM to TPM (Total Production Management), in addition to their operational 
duties, all members of operational teams became responsible for a managerial task such as looking 
after stock, external logistics, communication, the environment, OHS, etc., and for making 
continuous improvements in each of them. In addition, employees became the focus of HR 
managers making health interviews, carrying out certifications of qualifications and programs for 
systematic further training, etc. 
By 2001 certification in accordance with OHSAS 18001(x2) was in place, and the staff task force 
for the environment and OHS started recording all accidents and near-accidents and following them 
up in a speedy and systematic way. SRs and the SO were placed in offices in close contact with all 
parts of the shop floor, organized a number of awareness campaigns and furthermore started to 
work across teams, sections and factories to diffuse improvements. From being radical voices, the 
SO and SRs had been transformed into consultants who were frequently addressed by both 
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employees and managers seeking advice, commentaries on plans for new machines, changes in 
factory design or new buildings, etc.  All of this happened simultaneously with organizing lean 
dataflow in production. 
From then on, OHS initiatives did not originate with external governmental regulations but with the 
internal system of data-registration, employee suggestions, reports, meetings and cross-sectional 
visitations. Along with this, frequency in the innovation of new products and the restructuring of 
production teams and factories increased. Whereas PP used to be a quite predictable workplace, 
jobs were now continually being changed, opening up novel challenges, including skills upgrading, 
but also putting employees under a lot of conflicting pressures and stress. 
OHS in a multilayered governance system 
The OHSM system in PP operates on four interlinked levels: 
1. The first level is teams of operators, settlers and repairmen. This level is not simply the 
level of intervention and implementation of what has been decided from the top. On the 
contrary, it is on this level that both information and suggestions originate. If this level was 
not on its toes in reporting data and suggestions, the other parts of the system would seize 
up. On the one hand there have been awareness campaigns to stimulate the reporting of all 
accidents and near accidents, while on the other hand every team has a signpost showing in 
a very visible way how many days they have been working without accidents. The team 
members who are responsible for monitoring OHS ensures that reports, suggestions and 
measurements from the team are brought to the second layer of the SO, but all members of 
a team may simply make reports or suggestions on the ITC system that can be operated by 
any team member. The team is also very active. The number of accidents and near-
accidents has been increasing to such an extent that the upper levels of the OHSM are 
unsure whether accidents are really increasing or whether a strong reporting and ITC 
discipline is having this effect. It is significant that in 2006 employee suggestions for all 
types of improvements reached a preliminary maximum of 29,111 or 2.9 suggestions per 
employee. Of these, 21,170 were implemented or 2.1 suggestions per employee. Within the 
field of the environment and OHS, in 2006 it was obvious that the upper levels of the 
management system were lagging behind, only taking action on 30% of the suggestions that 
year. By 2007 things had improved, as action was being taken on 50% of the 6,701 
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suggestions within the OHS/environmental fields. This high level of suggesting and 
reporting by the operational levels cannot be explained by the system of remuneration. 
Though teams compete to come up with ‘the suggestion of the month or the year’, they are 
not rewarded personally but with a sum of money to be spent on a joint celebration for the 
team. Making team members responsible for the constant search for improvements within 
different monitoring areas probably institutionalizes a permanent discourse on the issues 
that are being benchmarked and furnish the larger system with a constant flow of inputs. 
These are not minor issues.  Settlers and repairmen told us that since the change to 
certification they initiate practical safety-improvements whenever they discovered a need to 
do so, and they had not yet been confronted with budgetary constraints when collaborating 
with one of the SRs. 
2. The next level of the OHSM system is the level of factory SO and of elected SRs. These 
may be organized in different ways in different factories. In the factory being investigated 
here, two SRs elected by the workers were doing the core task. One was focusing on 
reporting procedures, collecting data from teams and helping employees fill in forms and 
write suggestions if employees had difficulties in doing so, but also registering absenteeism 
and other employee data to fill up the workload to make a full task. The other SR was 
working in the factory, making practical OHS interventions and being called to solve 
practical problems with operators, settlers and repairmen. He had to be consulted before 
buying new machines and equipment, etc. Whereas the latter focuses on direct action in 
cooperation with operational teams, the former provides the organizational link to the larger 
OHSM system, organizes and participates in meetings in the OHS monitoring team, the 
factory SC and cross-factory visitations, and prepares new initiatives and campaigns. SRs 
share offices with shop stewards, enabling them to communicate across the divide between 
the WC and SC participatory systems of negotiation. This tight interplay makes it possible 
to react in a very efficient and timely fashion in cases of accidents and near-accidents and to 
discuss the causes if a certain section suddenly has a high level of absenteeism due to 
illness. In this way the SRs becomes a centre of gravity linked directly to operational teams, 
practical problem-solving, production management and the staff task force on OHS, which 
it is also formally related to, as both levels are represented in the head SC. Obviously the 
SO and the SRs had moved away from being in a side-car position to become highly 
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respected nodes in a network, where they acted as very active consultants, binding the 
levels together. 
3. The task force on OHS and the environment (STF) collects data on accidents, near-
accidents, absences due to illness and progress in terms of improving workplaces (WPA) 
from across teams and factories, and receives and takes action on the large number of 
employee suggestions for improvements. The STF has a strong tie of informal collaboration 
to the SRs and SOs in the individual factories, as it collects experiences, compares data 
across factories and identifies the more general problems that a factory might have 
compared to the rest. These day-to-day consultations with local SRs are probably the main 
coordination mechanism between bureaucratic rulings and employee participation, creating 
processual ordering on a day-to-day basis. The head of the STF chaired the head SC, where 
SRs from all factories were represented to take decisions and make more system-wide 
interventions based on participatory diagnoses of problems and assessment of solutions. On 
the basis of data-collection compared with benchmarks, participatory consultation on 
problems and diagnoses, the STF makes an annual report on progress, set-backs, problems 
and suggestions for the top-management team, a report simultaneously drawn up in 
accordance with the needs of the annual corporate CSR and sustainability reporting. 
4. The top management level of PP follows up on OHS issues in a yearly meeting with the 
head of the STF. Here the report mentioned above is discussed, benchmarks are compared 
with achievements and causes are sought for why some goals have not been met, why 
others seems saturated and whether current aspirations are the right ones. In this way 
preparations are made for the annual ‘public sustainability report’, which is surprisingly 
detailed and open in its criticisms of where PP has failed and of course very proud of the 
dimensions along which it has won prizes for extraordinary achievements. But it is also a 
meeting during which blame and recognition are allocated to the OHSM system in total. 
4.3 OHS as a system of learning by monitoring   
Reflecting on the above levels, it is obvious that in total they constitute a quite powerful system of 
learning by monitoring (Helper et al. 2000). First, there is a systematic way of reporting critical 
incidents (accidents, near-accidents, absenteeism due to illness, etc.) and of registering continuous 
improvements (WPA, reductions in repetitive work, dangers for pregnant employees, heavy lifts, 
etc.). Secondly, there is a continuous effort to detect problems and sudden improvements, and a 
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diagnostic capacity is being developed to make it possible to explain and understand the causes of 
both failures and successes, both to justify differences from planned benchmarks to top managers 
and to design new interventions on the shop floor. Thirdly, there is a systemic way of following up 
on incidents and conducting root-cause analyses, as well as a number of ways to diffuse lessons 
across teams, sections and factories. Concerning the latter, there is simultaneously a general 
awareness that this diffusion needs to become more efficient, which is one of the reasons why some 
of the elected SRs have been appointed ‘drivers’ to ensure that what has been decided is also 
implemented. 
However, in one respect the learning by monitoring system fails. The above description of the 
system was not visible to its participants but had to be discovered by  the field researcher. This 
means that the participants were working within a system they had not depicted, and for that reason 
they could not improve it deliberately or by design. The way the firm was constituted, it lacked an 
organ to work on deliberate changes to the constitution. 
4.4 The evolutionary legacy of the monitoring system 
Up to this point, the OHSM system has not emerged out of a single significant reform or design 
process. At one moment, elements have been added due to reforms to improve on quality. In others, 
the focus has been on the reform of and new agreements concerning the representative structure of 
SRs and shop stewards. Various OHS campaigns have added new features such as measuring the 
number of days with no accidents, the number of workplaces with no repetitive work, workplaces 
suitable for pregnant women, etc. One might say that new issues have been added as they became 
issues in the wider society, as new management fads emerged and as the SO reached saturation 
regarding past priorities and added new ones to those that were already being looked after. In many 
ways this evolution can be seen as parallel to the growth and sophistication of local agreements 
concerning technology, education, appraisal interviewing, etc. within the process of ordering that 
took place in relation to WCs, convenors and shop stewards, as mentioned above. However, with 
the turn to lean management, systematically measuring improvements, decentralizing managerial 
responsibilities to the monitoring teams and introducing IT-based suggestion and reporting 
procedures, the traditional negotiated ordering took on a different shape and became a system for 
learning by monitoring. However, it is a system that still seems dependent on the processual 
ordering that takes place in the WC system. 
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4.5  The participatory dimensions of the OHSM system 
This defect can certainly not be ascribed to a lack of channels for participation within the SC part. 
The four levels of the OHSM system are penetrated by participatory channels and are closely 
related to ongoing processes that are central to the evolution of the firm. No side-car here! 
And yet the system seems unable to reflect on and improve on itself as a system. The following 
example is illustrative. The STF raised the question of whether new benchmarks should be 
formulated bottom-up or top-down in an annual meeting with top management, but instead of being 
given an answer, it was itself asked to come up with one. But to find an answer is not easy. The 
current OHSM system has become structured so as to achieve effectiveness in attaining the given 
benchmarks so that any attempts to criticize the current benchmarks by the OHSM itself will be and 
should be seen by top managers to be bad excuses. Otherwise there is no way to curb the 
opportunistic games of middle managers. Thus the mandate to think and reflect on new benchmarks 
within OHS is without a social space. At the fourth level of the OHSM system it is simply not 
possible to work with these issues because top managers only know what they learn from the 
reporting mentioned earlier and have no chance to invent new, more appropriate benchmarks 
reflecting what has been learned in the internal experimental processes. 
The need for new benchmarks, seen from the STF, is probably triggered primarily by its work on 
the current benchmarks. After certification came into place in 2001 and until 2006 accidents 
dropped very impressively, but then they started to increase again year after year. Working with a 
soft version of root-cause analysis (Helper et al. 2000) to diagnose possible causes not only led to 
identification of these but also indicated that something was wrong with the current benchmarks. 
For instance, in 2007 the STF diagnosed a sudden increase in accidents as being caused by an 
increase in the frequency in accidents within an increasing group of newly recruited employees. As 
a solution, a series of new introductory courses for new employees was implemented. In 2008 this 
had the effect of bringing down accidents quite dramatically for new recruits, yet the frequency of 
accidents still increased, but now among employees with a long career within PP. At the time of 
interviewing, the STF was finding it impossible to tell whether this situation was being caused by 1) 
the frequency of accidents per employee increasing automatically due to automation and increasing 
capital intensities; 2) continuous improvements in reporting discipline so that employees were 
reporting more and more of less important accidents, thus raising the figures, even though 
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improvements may be significant; or 3) workers were opportunistically causing minor accidents 
(especially on Thursdays) to get a day off before the weekend. 
Interestingly enough the STF, the SO and the SRs were not in strong disagreement about these very 
different explanations for why the frequency of accidents was not being brought down, but saw 
them all as plausible alternative explanations. Jointly they felt under pressure as they had 
difficulties in explaining the data to top managers, but the existence of three alternative 
explanations makes it very difficult to take new actions. To improve the foundations for taking 
action, it became evident that the best way out of current problems was to find new ways to 
calibrate the benchmarks, for instance, by discriminating between more and less serious accidents, 
measuring the days they happen and creating  a novel frequency definition (e.g. including a measure 
of capital intensity), as well as setting up a metric of their causes, whereas now they only measure 
the consequences (e.g. number of sickness days). In deciding which route to take, the matrix of 
security agents seemed confused and unable to identify an agency from which to seek help. 
Another good example is when absence due to illness suddenly increases in a single department 
when compared both over time and with other departments. If investigations prove that it is not 
caused by either OHS or an infection, the diagnosis might point towards either mutual harassment 
among employees or bad leadership. In that case the STF enters a no-man’s-land, where there is a 
large but unfulfilled need for data to make diagnosis possible and initiate improvements. In PP as in 
most other Danish enterprises such problems fall under the auspices of HR managers, shop stewards 
and WCs, which have not started to work since the systematic procedures of learning by monitoring 
made possible by the OHSM system were introduced. Within the HR/WC system such problems are 
usually treated as individualistic, psychological problems, and employees would probably go to 
shop stewards, who would treat each event in isolation. With no systematic data-collection 
surrounding such events, neither root cause analysis nor learning is possible. However, such events 
make it possible to see that two very strong participatory systems – one WC-related, the other SC-
related – compete and undermine each other instead of being complementary and mutually self-
correcting.  
But why not then reform the WC-related system along the lines of the templates of the SC-related 
system? The answer is quite obvious: in such a case, the WC-related system would be exactly as 
self-limiting in its actions as the SC-related system. The great advantage of the WC-related 
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participatory system is that it is free from following fixed benchmarks and able to act situationally 
and independently of managements’ opportunistic games.    
 
5 Creating a space for the re-ordering of OHS monitoring systems 
The reason why top managers cannot and should not simply take on the responsibility of improving 
the OHSM, its benchmarks and metrics and the way it learns by monitoring is, first, that, if top 
managers accept that unsatisfied benchmarks may be attributed to their wrong formulation, the 
hierarchical pressure for improvements may simply falter and create a space for opportunistic 
games of shirking and misinformation that could jeopardize the very foundations of OHS 
certification. Secondly, top managers are not in a position to see and discover the deep needs for 
improvements. Talking to employees, it is quite obvious that a number of problems can only be 
detected from practice as an employee. For instance, the fact that the combination of night shifts 
with team organization was causing problems was for a long time neglected by top managers. 
Because night shifts were run without managers, mutual harassment developed into vicious circles, 
turning the autonomous teams into veritable jungles. The chosen solution to the problem was 
simply to put managers on night shifts, though it was made without any root-cause analysis. But it 
is possible to imagine that a methodology continuously to civilize and improve on social relations 
among team members could have constituted an alternative, that benchmarks for measuring 
improvements could have been heuristically designed, and that these could have been assigned to 
the monitoring teams as new monitoring responsibilities. 
The same goes for stress and psychological diseases. Instead of the shop stewards and HR managers 
dealing with these as individual cases only, a systemic way of analysing causes, registering near-
stress symptoms, etc. could be used first to design a heuristic set of benchmarks to make learning by 
monitoring possible, and then start a search for better calibrated benchmarks to guide interventions. 
Up to now only benchmarks that reflect very basic, externally defined, potential problems, accidents 
or disasters have been stressed in continuous improvement efforts at PP. But it is easy to imagine 
more aggressive searches to improve the workplace in terms of human growth and elevation. 
Interviews with groups of workers revealed that much has been done to take into special 
consideration the needs of pregnant women. But a life-course perspective on an entire working 
career would also make it possible to develop benchmarks for the suitability of some workplaces 
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for, for example, single mothers with small children, elderly workers with minor mental handicaps, 
etc. Especially young single people saw the workplace as a surprisingly open space for endemic 
streams of challenges and projects – even for de jure unskilled workers – but felt that they lacked 
the necessary transparency to plan a career going from minor to more sophisticated challenges and 
projects, and combining this with a progressive ladder of further training schemes. Obviously PP 
could gain much from systematizing career patterns for workers in different life-course situations 
and by devising benchmarks measuring the extent to which progress in different situations happens 
annually. Surely these progressions should be linked to how the search for a still more advanced 
strategic identity for PP in relation to its customers and suppliers has progressed in its totality. 
Reasoning along these lines, it becomes obvious that PP is in need of a novel patterning of the 
negotiating order and the management structure. The lean system at the core and the OHS system 
linked to it together constitute a powerful machine for learning by monitoring and for perfecting 
and calibrating existing benchmarks, but an inbuilt ability to widen and reform its operational range 
is lacking. Top managers have the power to do this, but if they do so they risk opening up the field 
for opportunistic games, and they lack the familiarity with problems and aspirations that need to be 
taken into consideration in improving the system. 
Conversely, the much more ad hoc and flexible participatory system for negotiation constituted by 
HR managers, shop stewards, convenors, works councils and their sub-committees is ideally placed 
to capture new issues, problems and aspirations. However, instead of dealing directly with unusual 
problems in an situational way, this HR/WC system should react to such problems by creating ad 
hoc task forces that could investigate new needs for coping with stress, the causes of harassment, 
the need for calibrating existing benchmarks, how to make career ladders visible, etc. more 
systematically. Organizing negotiations on such issues with top managers – the fourth level in the 
OHSM – would constitute an ideal space, much less infiltrated by middle-managers engaged in real 
or imagined opportunistic games. This is particularly the case where the WC-related participatory 
system is not trying to capture new mandates for itself, but aims at institutionalizing new mandates 
or ways of monitoring them for other bodies, such as the SC-related participatory monitoring 
system.  
Following its refinements since the early 1990s, the traditional WC participatory system no doubt 
sees itself as much more capable than the SC participatory system in dealing with unpredicted 
problems. Often its elected representatives have followed very advanced courses and are linked to 
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similarly wise activists in other companies with a feel for how businesses are shifting under 
globalization. This constitutional part of the firm therefore has a propensity to keep issues under the 
control of its own circles in order to make sure that things are being handled competently. As a 
consequence, it often becomes overburdened and highly stressed and tends to work on issues in a 
very situational way. On the other hand, the SC-related participatory system is much more efficient 
in operating within given mandates and is better placed to produce rapid and more efficient progress 
once the dimensions which require continuous improvements have been identified. 
Both the WC- and SC-related participatory systems have been established according to rules of law 
or by central agreements among the social partners. As already indicated they have both changed in 
terms of task and importance because of general managerial reforms (especially the change towards 
lean), new forms of work organization and a different pace in innovation. But both are encapsulated 
mutually by a division of labour that belongs to the old economy. To work much more effectively to 
the benefit of both managers and employees, the entire participatory system should be recast so that 
the WC arm takes care of organizing ad hoc development, while the SC arm takes on the 
responsibility of making improvements effective on a much more broad range of issues needed for 
constructing better forms of work organization.  
Simultaneously it would probably be of great help to both participatory arms if institutions in 
society were set up that could create imaginative new benchmarks of a new, more offensive type so 
that these could become heuristic devices for the labour movement in its search for promising new 
forms of work organization and working careers among a constituency that is becoming 
increasingly differentiated. 
6. Final Discussion  
A cynic might see the current swarms of new benchmarks, certifications and de-regulation of 
government inspection as a way for employers and shareholders to increase their authority over 
wage-earners, an authority that many observers saw being eroded during the late 1970s, when wage 
increases, worker militancy, wage-earner funds, public ownership, etc. were limiting the influence 
of both shareholders and managers. The new regime, on the contrary, has made it easier for 
managers in the headquarters of multinational companies to exert pressure on rival subsidiaries, and 
for subsidiary managers to put pressure on rival departments and teams, as well as on rival 
suppliers. This game of imposing constantly changing benchmarks seems to have made it almost 
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impossible for lower units in the ‘hierarchy’ to define a coherent long-term strategy for and by 
itself, as the survival of teams and subsidiaries, like the promotion of individual managers within a 
corporate hierarchy, is determined by how well they measure against these benchmarks rather than 
on how well they are developing the firm unit, both in the long term and for its constituency of 
workers and managers. 
In this respect, OHS certification and an associated benchmarking system constitute both a 
continuation and a possible transformation of a trend. OHS focuses its benchmarks on 
improvements in the conditions of and prospects for the constituents of the firm unit and works with 
initial measures assessing whether a firm is following a path that works to the advantage or 
disadvantage of its workers. 
Within this framework, workers, their representatives and unions may gradually learn that they 
should themselves begin to formulate, negotiate and set new benchmarks for what they see as 
improvements and what they consider to be setbacks. Working conditions, both physical and 
psychological, are an important first step. The degree of human development and learning that a 
firm’s evolution brings about could be the next step. But this involves a whole new set of questions. 
Which benchmarks should be used to evaluate whether the ‘we’ of workers, such as a firm unit 
within a corporation, are progressing towards a more or less advantageous situation in terms of 
‘our’ relations with customers and suppliers, as well as with the larger labour market? 
As workers start to pose these questions, and to the degree they are able to translate them into 
benchmarks, the potential to move from a regime that is distributive to one involving integrative 
bargaining will increase. Institutionalizing the novel benchmarks of this regime into ‘learning by 
monitoring’, novel managerial techniques and negotiating orders will force micro-agencies to 
search for compromises between externally imposed and internally evoked prerogatives and 
benchmarks. In a world where managers are continually on the move between business units and 
positions, the work of workers in refining benchmarking, finding novel ways of negotiating them 
and improving systems of learning by monitoring could turn into a search for the long-term identity 
of the enterprise, whereas those benchmarks that frequently change and are externally imposed 
would simply help to question, doubt and inspire the search for endogenous and still more 
ambitious and relevant benchmarks. 
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The certification of OHS is creating a much more open field in which such an evolution could take 
place. In Denmark, such an evolution seems to be possible in some of the advanced versions of 
certified OHSM systems, but that is greatly dependent on the old negotiating order of shop 
stewards, convenors and WCs playing a novel role and preparing action to expand the scope of the 
SC participatory system. However, it is obvious that in learning organizations such as those present 
in the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Austria, the introduction of lean managerial principles 
can best co-evolve with highly decentralized forms of work organization provided there is one 
participatory system that can organize improvements and another to reform the first and to identify 
novel issues to renew the firm in accordance with endogenous aspirations. 
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